Unprofound Theologian FrankenPope’s Three Favorite Theologians are Second Rate Relativists or Heretical Dissenters

Friday, March 16, 2018

Unprofound Theologian FrankenPope’s Three Favorite Theologians are Second Rate Relativists or Heretical Dissenters

Is Pope Francis the new Pope Horonius?

The unscholarly Pope Honorius was a heretic who promoted the Monothelitist heresy. He was condemned by a general council and Pope St. Agatho and Pope St. Leo II.

The Catholic Encyclopedia said of Honorius that he “was not a profound theologian, and allowed himself to be confused and mislead.” (Edward Feser.blogspot, “Denial flows into the Tiber,” December 18, 2016)

Theologian Tracey Rowland wrote that Francis before the papacy said “I can’t imagine anything more boring than Fundamental Theology.” She quotes Ross Douthat saying:

“Francis is clearly a less systematic thinker than… his predecessors” to the papacy. (Catholic Theology, page 192)

Francis is not a profound theologian and neither are three of his favorite theologians.

Austen Ivereigh at Crux recently did a reviewed of Massimo Borghesi’s book called “Jorge Mario Bergoglio, Una Biografia intellettuale” which shows that much of Pope Francis’s thinking comes from Fr. Gaston Fessard.

Ivereigh claims that Fessard is “anti-Hegelian.”

As usual, Ivereigh is wrong.

Back in 1950, Thomist Jules “Icaac was accusing Fessard of identifying this quasi-science of thought with the science of the real order, or metaphysics. That is what Hegel does.”

“The executive function of the dialectic, as Isaac interpreted Aquinas, uses the law of thought in a concrete instance of thinking or arguing. Because Fessard used these laws not as laws of arguing, but as laws of the development of historical events, he is again accused of Hegelianism.” (“Gaston Fessard S.J., His Work Toward A Theology of History,” by Mary Alice Muir, 1970, page 30)

Sadly, Fessard realized that Hegelianism is historicism or relativism.

He hoped to save Hegel’s dialectic thought from relativism with his confused twisting of Aquinas, but instead it appears that he became a soft Hegelian historicist and relativist because of his second rate thinking.

Fr. Edmundus Waldstein, O. Cist., at sancrucensis.wordpress.com, gives an overview of another of Francis’s  favorite theologians  Fr. Bernard Haring:

“In a discussion with the General Congregation of the Society of Jesus, the Holy Father praised Fr. Bernard Haring for having helped overcome a decadent scholastic moral theology that had been fixated on negative commandments, and opened up a way for moral theology to flourish. Now, Haring’s moral theology is a great example of what it might mean to begin processes as opposed to occupying spaces.” (Dubia and Initiating Processes, December 7, 2016, sancrucensis.wordpress.com)
Even Amoris Laetitia supporter Jeff Mirus in a March 7, 2017 article for Catholic Culture.com said anyone who would praise Haring “as one of the first to give Catholic moral theology new life in the twentieth century must be ignorant, confused, or subversive.”
In the beginning of the post, titled “Pope Francis and Bernard Haring: The literally infernal cheek of dissent,” Mirus said:
“Pope Francis praised…Fr. Bernard Haring, for being one of the first to try to revive an ailing moral theology following the Second Vatican Council.”
The article presented some of the moral theologian’s dissenting heretical teachings:
“In his 1973 book Medical Ethics Haring defended sterilization, contraception and artificial insemination…According to Haring, under difficult circumstances, we may engage in a process of discernment which leads to the commission of intrinsically evil acts.”
The big agenda of Haring, besides allowing intrinsically evil acts, is a Hegelian philosophic idealistic subjective metaphysics of historical becoming which denies objective truth and Catholic objective truth. Waldstein, O. Cist., explains:
“This is a soft version of certain strands of modern historicism, indebted to Hegel. Having abandoned nature, and an objective teleological order, Hegel and some of his followers give to history a role analogous to that played by nature in classical philosophy…. Haring is proposing something similar for the life of the Church.”
“I call this sort of historicism “soft” since its proponents would not all be willing to affirm the dark core of Hegel’s account of the good. But by adopting historicist terms they tend to draw conclusions that imply the basically subjectivist, modern account of the good, and the account of freedom that follows from it. Thomas Stark has shown how these problems play out in the theology of Cardinal Kasper [Another of Francis’s favorite theologians].”[sancrucensis.wordpress.com/2016/12/07/dubia-and-initiating-processes/#more-5361]

Finally, we get the theologian Francis considers “the greatest theologian for today.”

The nihilist that Pope Francis considers to “be the greatest theologian for today” believes that there is no “possibility of an objective basis for truth” and that there is no objective meaning or reality. (Dictionary.com definitions of nihilism)

The extremely heretical nihilist Michel de Certeau believed in all of the above.

In simple words, de Certeau’s theology denies objective truth and objective Catholic truth.

The present Pope considers him the most eminent modern theologian. Francis said:

“For me, de Certeau is still the greatest theologian for today.” (onepeterfive.com, March 8, 2016, “Pope Francis Reveals His Mind to Private Audience”)

De Certeau in his greatest book “Heterologies” said:

“It is not Mr. Foucault who is making fun of domains of knowledge… It is history that is laughing at them. It plays tricks on the teleologists who take themselves to be the lieutenants of meaning. A meaninglessness of history.” (“Heterologogies,” Pages 195-196)

Historian Keith Windschuttle shows that the Pope’s favorite modern theologian is a radical who thinks that there is no outside reality. Windschuttle wrote:

“Of all the French theorists… de Certeau is the most radical. He is critical of the poststructuralist Foucault for his use of documentary evidence and of Derrida for the way he privileges the practice of writing. For de Certeau, writing is a form of oppression… he argues… writing itself constitutes the act of colonisation…”

“Like both structuralist and poststructuralist theorists, de Certeau subscribes to the thesis that we have access only to our language and not to any real, outside world…”

“De Certeau claims that writing can never be objective. Its status is no different from that of fiction. So, because history is a form of writing, all history is also fiction.” (“The Killing of History,” Pages 31-34)

By Francis’s greatest modern theologian’s logic then Jesus Christ, true God and true man, who walked the earth during the reign of Pontius Pilate is fiction.

The central doctrine of Catholism, the Incarnation, is fiction.

Post Structuralists like de Certeau, more widely known as Postmodernists, believe all reality is fiction or “narrative.”

They change the “narrative” or story usually to compile with their leftist or liberal views on politics, sexual morality or whatever their pet project happens to be.

They rarely use scholarship to backup their “narrative” point of view, only mind numbing long confusing writing that obscures instead of clarifying.

The Postmodernists in the media are one exception to the obscurantism of non-clarity.

Their “narratives” are clear and well written, but again rarely is there scholarship or strong evidence to backup their stories. They use spin to obscure.

Media spin “narrative” is “news and information that is manipulated or slanted to affect its interpretation and influence public opinion.” (Dictionary.com)

They usually use their “narratives” in history, news, the Bible and any writing as a vehicle to promote their ideological ideas.

With that background, here is the Pope’s favorite theologian’s central religious ideas. The de Certeau Scholar Johannes Hoff wrote:

“According to this new approach to the Biblical narrative, the focal event of Christianity is not the incarnation, the crucifixion, or the resurrection of Christ, but the empty tomb. The Christian form of life is no longer associated with a place, a body, or an institution, but with a quest for a missing body: the missing body of the people of Israel, and mutatis mutandis the missing body of Jesus.”
(Article by Johannes Hoff, “Mysticism, Ecclesiology And The Body Christ: Certeau’s (Mis-) Reading of Corpus Mystium and the Legacy of Henri de Lubac” Page 87, Titus Brandsma Institute Studies In Spirituality, Supplement 24, “Spiritual Spaces: History and Mysticism in Michel De Certeau”)

The nihilist theologian believes that the central truths of Christianity are about “absence” or nonexistence. De Certeau scholar Graham Ward wrote:

“For de Lubac the… Eucharist is not a sign of the presence of Christ’s body, it is Christ’s body… And yet Certeau… makes the Eucharist (as later the church and body of mystical text he treats) into substitutes, acts of bereavement, signs of absence.” (“Michel de Certeau – in the Plural, ” Page 511)

In other words, Francis’s greatest modern theologian believes that the Eucharist is not the body of Christ present, he doesn’t even believe it is a sign of the presence of Christ’s body like some Protestants, but a sign of “absence.”

Might de Certeau’s influence on Francis be the reason he never kneels before the Eucharist, but kneels to wash the feet of those he like Certeau might consider oppressed?

De Certeau’s influence on Francis may be the reason he reportedly said:

“It is not excluded that I will enter history as the one who split the Catholic Church.” (Der Spiegel magazine, December, 23, 2016)

De Certeau scholar Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt wrote:

“Certeau… came increasingly to stress the clash of interpretation, the “law of conflict,” that applies even to the church. Under the pressure of this clash, the ecclesial/eucharistic body is “shattered.” (“Michael de Certeau – in the Plural”, Page 359)

Francis’s greatest modern theologian doesn’t believe in the central truths of the Catholic Church.

The Pope’s most eminent modern theologian doesn’t even believe in objective truth.

Does Francis believe in the central doctrines of the Catholic Church or in objective truth?

The question needs to be asked:

If the Pope is a disciple of de Certeau and Postmodernism, then what ultimately do he and these thinkers believe in?

Philosopher Stephen Hicks said:

The “Left thinkers of the 1950s and 1960s… Confronted by the continued poverty and brutality of socialism, they could either go with the evidence and reject their most cherish ideals – or stick by their ideals and attack the whole idea that evidence and logic matter…”

“Postmodernism is born of the marriage of Left politics and skeptical epistemology…”

“Then, strikingly, postmodernism turns out not to be relativistic at all. Relativism becomes part of a rhetorical political strategy, some Machiavellian realpolitik employed to throw the opposition off track…”

“Here it is useful to recall Derrida: ‘deconstruction never had any meaning… than as a radicalization… within the tradition of a certain Marxism, in a certain spirit of Marxism.'” (“Explaining Postmodernism,” Page 90, 186)

For Postmodernists like de Certeau, Derrida, Foucault and it appears Francis, if he is their disciple, falsehood or truth doesn’t matter.

The only thing that matters is achieving power for their liberal ideology or group.

Instead of economic Marxism, the post-modernist in the 1970’s focused on what de Certeau and other post-modernists termed “oppression” of groups.

Power not truth for groups such as women, gays, transexauls, workers and any sub-category of minorities was the new goal to achieving control.

An example is abortion: women had to have power over their bodies so the truth that the unborn baby is human must be denied and politically incorrect.

Another example is homosexual acts: gays had to have power over their bodies so the truth that is was a sin and lead to disease and a early death had to be denied and politically incorrect.

Remember that liberals, who never use Marxist words, are nothing but post-modernist who use words like equality and compassion as masks for raw power.

Venezuela is another example.

The liberals from Fr. James Martin to Pope Francis will not lift a finger or say a word to stop the Venezuelan people from being starved and brutalized because the country’s dictator is part of their liberal group.

The liberals means to achieve power in the Church is praxis theology.

Internationally renowned theologian Dr. Tracey Rowland said Francis’s “decision – making process” outlined in Evangelii Gaudium is “the tendency to give priority to praxis over theory.”

She states that chapter eight of Amoris Laetitia “might be described as the praxis chapter rather than a theory chapter.” Theory meaning Catholic doctrine.

The renowned theologian asks how footnote 351 of Amoris Laetitia “can be consistent with paragraph eighty-four of John Paul II’s Apostolic Exhortation Familiaris consortio and paragraph twenty-nine of Benedict XVI’s Apostolic Exhortation Sacramentum Caritatis? A pastoral crisis may arise if the lay faithful and their priests have to choose between… two Popes (John Paul II and Benedict XVI) on one side, and a third Pope (Pope Francis) on the other.” (“Catholic Theology,” Page 192, 198, 199)

The choice appears to be between the infallible doctrines of the Catholic Church or praxis theology.

Rowland says “praxis types agree in rejecting classical metaphysics.” She then explains praxis ideology or “theology”:

“Doctrinal theory is at best extrinsic and secondary. The reflex character of theory-praxis tends toward a reduction of theory to reflection on praxis as variously understood. The normativity tends toward an identification of Christianity with modern, secular (liberal or Marxist) process.” (“Catholic Theology,” Page174)

If what the internationally renowned theologian is saying is true of Pope Francis and praxis “theology,” then the Church is in the greatest crisis in history.

The Church has a Pope who has betrayed Jesus Christ and His Gospel for the world.

It appears that Francis has exchanged the Gospel of Jesus Christ for “secular (liberal or Marxist)” ideology which denies objective truth.

Pray an Our Father now for the restoration of Church, the beloved bride of Jesus Christ.

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13 comments on “Unprofound Theologian FrankenPope’s Three Favorite Theologians are Second Rate Relativists or Heretical Dissenters

  1. One Pater Noster having been prayed, I rise, Mr. Chairman, to address a point of theological disorder implicit in the truly shrewd analysis offered by Mr. Martinez.
    /
    To wit, if a presumptive pope: Glorifies a postmodernist headcase like de Certeau; and by his own Pontifical Praxis (of which it is fair to say he has his own cranium fully up his Praxis) injects pathogenic agents into the body he governs through intimidation and aborts young religious societies in their earliest developmental stages (for their inufficient hipness) is it then not fair to ask, in the absence of significant evidence to the contrary: Is ANYONE even remotely Catholic still running the Catholic Church?
    /
    Reserving the balance of my time, I yield back to the Chair such time as my highly esteemed colleagues may consume to advance the question…

    • From the Truth-Is-Stranger-Than-Fiction Dept.:
      /
      Polish Priest Suggests Praying for [Good] Death of Pope Francis
      /
      en.news – 3/18/18
      /
      Father Edward Staniek, 77, said in a homily on February 25 that he is praying that the Holy Sprit may help Pope Francis to return to the Catholic Faith or else let him quickly go to his eternal reward.
      /
      He explained that Francis is “moving away from Jesus” in his teaching. One of the examples he gave was Francis’ Communion for adulterers, “Admitting the unholy people to holiness in the Church is a profanation of the sacraments” – the priest noticed.
      /
      After a conversation with Father Staniek, Cracow Archbishop Marek Jędraszewski declared that he was saddened by Staniek’s words, “I assure you that the whole Church in Cracow is praying for Pope Francis daily and fervently” – he exaggerated.
      /
      Fr Staniek was ordained in 1965 by the later Pope John Paul II. From 1993 to 2001, Staniek was rector of the seminary in Krakow.

      • A suggested prayer for Fr. Staniek from the satirical Compleat Bellairs: The John Bellairs [RIP] Wiki:

        The Prayer for the Speedy Demise of a Bishop [applicable to a pope, who is a bishop – namely, that of Rome] is a prayer included within The Moist Heart, a liturgical book used for the celebration of Mass (Saint Fidgeta and Other Parodies, p. 118): O God, who dost daily sweep Thine Eternal Dwellings, grant that the soul of the superflous N. may be sucked up into the Dustbag of Bliss, where spinning motes circle ever before Thy Throne.
        /
        I have previously use the Compleat Bellairs as a source for satire where the truth is stranger than it; for example, Bellairs’ version of a Catholic forum wherein a distraught reader writes, “It’s freezing in the house, because my husband won’t turn on the heat; he says that central heating is condemned somewhere in Pope Pius IX’s Syllabus Errorum.” I cited that as an example of truth being stranger than satire in the case of FrankenPope’s criticism of air-conditioning in his encyclical Laudato Si.

  2. Seriously, though, it’s beyond anything but a miracle that this psychopath, or any of his Modernist ilk, convert.
    Failing that, the sooner they die, the better. They’ll be able to pile up fewer sins, so in the end their hell will be less hot.
    I’m praying for a miracle right now, but speedy death is a necessary second choice, for the common good of the world as well as their own.

  3. Well, it’s unseemly, at best, to pray that anyone in particular might head off for a dirt nap. Frustration IS taking its toll on otherwise good clergy. Praying and working to minimize damage and convince those capable of taking action is an act of piety. And to such must we limit ourselves while alerting others to danger and seeking correction by those with the actual power to do so.
    /
    We must leave divine justice to the Divinity, which infallibly comes forth out of even disastrous circumstances.

    • Absolutely, my friend.
      It’s a matter of priorities.
      /
      “As I live, saith the Lord God, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way, and live.”
      /
      On the other hand:
      “…whosoever shall scandalize one of these little ones that believe in me: it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck and he were cast into the sea.”
      /
      What I am actually asking for is not justice, but mercy.
      /
      Not even Pope Francis could complain about that, right?
      /
      Ummm…except for that part about hell, I guess. :o/
      Since he, with such incredible foolishness, said that “No one is condemned forever”.

  4. The “praxis” chatter in modernist theology and Liberation theology is picked up from Marxism and derives from Left Hegelians. Marx’s bromance with Feuerbach. It is a frequent narrative among anti-Thomist and anti-orthodox modernists deconstructing Catholicism. In vogue when modernist theology students at Weston and Berkeley were sporting Lenin beards in the ’70s when plans to merge with Union Theological Seminary and Yale broke down, as the Jesuits imploded after Vatican II. What “praxis” involved at this time included Cesar Chavez-inspired lettuce boycotts and attending anti-nuclear protests, aging liberal hippie priests and nuns breaking into a missile silo with sledge hammers. You need a beret and a Cesar Chavez or Che Guevara T-shirt to do modernist “praxis” correctly.



    Younger neo-Catholic converts may laugh at that, but gear is very important in modernist praxis and the hippie priest protest scene.



    Neck wear and chains can be important.





    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Praxis_(process)

    Now, ironically, “praxis” is actually one of the few ancient Greek words to survive the theological purges after Vatican II. Along with agape. Liturgy becomes agape and theology becomes “praxis” after Vatican II. In case you thought theology was just reading, studying, and explaining Catholic doctrine.

    • Ah yes, ‘praxis’…’agape’. Such lovely words. They make us look so educated, intelligent, sophisticated…best of all, so traditional!
      Ah yes, hanging crosses around our necks. Such a lovely thing. Makes us look so… holy — and traditional!
      /
      Ok, boys, let’s go out there and – – – – – those stupid sheep!

  5. Fine observations, Sir.



  6. Bill Gannon: Hey, Joe, what’s with all the progressive modernism and neo-Hegelianism coming out of the Vatican under Pope Francis these days?



    Sgt. Joe Friday: Maybe Pope Francis wants to be the first pope appointed Secretary General of the UN.



    Hawkeye: What do you think of Pope Francis and his pontificate so far, Father?



    Father Mulcahy, S.J.: Well, if you could combine Groucho Marx, Eva Perón, and Inspector Clouseau all into one Pope….Pope Francis would still be funnier. Of course, it’s very tricky to be funny and sanctimonious at the same time. And therein we find his Argentine genius.



    Hawkeye: Is that all? Just Groucho? Not Harpo? Chico, Gummo, or Zeppo?



    Groucho: Can you picture me as pope?





    Father Mulcahy, S.J.: Well, occasionally his authoritarian and dictatorial leadership style suggests Moe from The Three Stooges.



    Hawkeye: Moe from The Three Stooges? With Groucho and Eva Perón to lighten up the Ultramontanism?



    Father Mulcahy, S.J.: Which reminds me of a novice master we had at Wernersville in the novitiate…



    Father Mulcahy, S.J,: …who could never stop talking about phallic symbols. You see, he had studied Freud at NYU in the early 1970s…and to make a long story short, some people are really just too unstable to hear Confessions, Hawkeye….







    • Sgt. Joe Friday: Maybe Pope Francis wants to be the first pope appointed Secretary General of the UN.

      New UN Secretary General Another Puppet For Pope Francis?

      October 11, 2016
      Hilari Henriques

      Like a chess match, Satan is moving his agents in key positions and is consolidating his forces for the great and final contest. One of those primary positions which he is seeking to occupy with one of his instrumentalities is Secretary-General of the United Nations. “The United Nations Security Council Thursday formally approved the nomination of former Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Guterres to be the next secretary-general. The recommendation now goes to the 193-member UN General Assembly for final ratification… If selected by the membership for the five-year term, he would succeed Ban Ki-moon, a South Korean whose second five-year term ends on December 31.”1 The Roman Catholic Church with its leader, Pope Francis, and members are delighted at the nomination as a Crux News headline reads, “New UN Secretary General could become key Papal ally;”2 this is so because his position on major issues align with that of Pope Francis.

      The article continues, “Assuming he’s approved by the General Assembly on Oct. 17, former Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Guterres is set to become the new U.N. Secretary General, and his background suggests he could become a key global ally of Pope Francis…In his vision statement in applying for the position of secretary general, Guterres wrote of the challenges facing the world in terms of rising inequality, terrorism and organized crime, climate change and the proliferation of armed actors internationally. All are issues about which Francis has often spoken, even producing a teaching document on the environment.”3

      It is no secret that the incumbent Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, was enamored with Pope Francis, even calling him “a man of humility and humanity…a man of moral voice, and purpose”4 before he addressed the United Nations in September. He also praised Pope Francis’ environmental encyclical stating “that he and Pope Francis agree that climate change is a moral issue that requires collective urgent actions…Mr. Ban deeply thanked Pope Francis for taking such a “strong stand” on the need for urgent global action. His moral voice is part of a growing chorus of people from all faiths and all sectors of society speaking out for climate action.”5

      How can a person be even more of a puppet for Pope Francis than Mr. Moon, one may inquire. It is clear that certain men are selected (not elected) for certain positions at certain times to fulfill specific purposes; and it seems that Mr. Guterres is just such a man for this time to carry out the biddings of Pope Francis. Even before he takes office, it must be noted that he has already demonstrated his admiration for and loyalty towards the Roman Catholic Church. He has already met with Pope Francis and has also privately met with Pope Benedict XVI when he was serving as Pope. “The Portuguese Guterres visited the Argentine Pontiff in Rome on December 2013. At the end of their private audience, Guterres said: ‘The Catholic Church has always been a very important voice in the defense of refugees and migrants. A voice of tolerance, of respect to diversity in an indifferent world, if not hostile, to everything that’s foreign…Pope Francis not only indicates what must be the just doctrine for the Christian community, but he’s a personal witness,’ he said, before praising the pontiff’s Evangelii Gaudium exhortation and his visit to the Italian island of Lampedusa.”6

      The Prophecies of Revelation 13 and specifically 17 are quickly coming to pass and will involve the entire world. “And the ten horns [nations] which thou sawest are ten kings, which have received no kingdom as yet; but receive power as kings one hour with the beast [Roman Catholicism]. These shall make war with the Lamb” Revelation 17:12-14.

      While Satan is strategically placing men to fill certain positions in the attempt to go against God and His people, while exalting himself, God is calling upon His people to awaken to the times in which they are living so that they can be used to fill the position He has called them to occupy and accomplish the work He has called them to perform.

      “In a special sense Seventh-day Adventists have been set in the world as watchmen and light bearers. To them has been entrusted the last warning for a perishing world. On them is shining wonderful light from the word of God. They have been given a work of the most solemn import–the proclamation of the first, second, and third angels’ messages. There is no other work of so great importance. They are to allow nothing else to absorb their attention.”7 Let us be found faithful!

      1. www.cnn.com/2016/10/06/world/united-nations-secretary-general/
      2. cruxnow.com/global-church/2016/10/07/new-un-secretary-general-become-key-papal-ally/
      3. Ibid
      4. en.radiovaticana.va/news/2015/09/10/un_sec-gen_pope_francis_a_man_of_moral_voice_and_purpose/1171035
      5. www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51186#.V_mfRoWcHIU
      6. cruxnow.com/global-church/2016/10/07/new-un-secretary-general-become-key-papal-ally/
      7. White, Ellen. Testimonies for the Church, Volume 9 (1909), page 19

      ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

      [In a more serious vein]

      Two “Popes” to Speak for the World: The Pope and the United Nations Secretary General in World Politics
      Jodok Troy
      Pages 67-78 | Published online: 13 Nov 2017
      Download citation doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2017.1392712
      In this article
      Servant of God, Servant of Governments
      Institutions, Agency, and the Pope’s and UNSG’s Moral Leadership
      The Pope and the UNSG in World Politics
      Conclusion
      References
      Click to increase image sizeFree first page
      Despite recent studies on leadership, the discipline of International Relations is still reluctant to engage in studies of individual agency in the international structure.1
      1. E.g. Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis (2015 Horowitz, Michael C., Allan C. Stam, and Cali M. Ellis. 2015. Why Leaders Fight. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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      ), Sandal (2017 Sandal, Nukhet A. 2017. Religious Leaders and Conflict Transformation: Northern Ireland and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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      ), Byman and Pollack (2001 Byman, Daniel L., and Kenneth M. Pollack. 2001. “Let Us Now Praise Great Man: Bringing the Statesman Back in.” International Security 25 (4): 107–146. doi: 10.1162/01622880151091916
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      ).
      View all notes
      Two prominent examples are the leader of the Catholic Church, the pope, and the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General (UNSG). Neither of them is a leader in control of considerable hard power, yet both exemplify the puzzle of how institutions, individuals, and moral authority relate in leadership. I argue that it is a combination of individuals in institutions that leads to unexpected and unintended effects such as the evolution of the papacy and the UNSG as instances of moral authorities. While pointing out their potential for moral leadership, this article presents a conceptual framework of how to perceive the Pope and the UNSG in world politics. The article unfolds in three sections: in the first, I look at the potential of comparing the two positions in terms of moral leadership and their emphasis of the common good. In a literature review, I then outline the current state of the literature on the two positions and what it misses. The remainder of the paper proposes a conceptual framework on how the two positions fit into the current literature and what promising future research for International Relations it conceals.

      Servant of God, Servant of Governments
      In many regards, both positions, the papacy and the UNSG, represent an anachronism. The individuals that represent them are elected in dubious ways, influenced by variables hard to grasp, and both are heirs of political developments that shaped the establishment of positions and institutions that have long since changed. Nevertheless, the pope and the “secular Pope,” the UNSG, are two individuals whose voices are given particular attention in world politics. They are quite similar as both depend on the character of the office holder and the institution. It is thus not only about authority and autonomy of the organization arising out of delegated, moral, and expert authority (Barnett and Finnemore 2004 Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. 2004. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
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      ). Rather, like executive heads,2
      2. I am aware that, in a formal sense, neither the UNSG nor the pope is an “executive officer.”
      View all notes
      the Pope and the UNSG are in authority and an authority themselves (see also Barnett and Finnemore 2004 Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. 2004. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
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      , 25). Eventually, such positions lead to good leadership which is “valued as a moral necessity” (Burns 2003 Burns, James M. 2003. Transforming Leadership: A New Pursuit of Happiness. New York: Grove Press.
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      , 2).3
      3. Regardless the demand for a global leader, in case of the UNSG, this demand “has not generally been matched by a supply of high-quality candidates” (Chesterman 2015 Chesterman, Simon, ed. 2015. “The Secretary-General We Deserve?” Global Governance 21: 13–505.
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      , 506).
      View all notes

      ‘Vous êtes mon homologue laïque,” Pope Pius XXII told UNSG Dag Hammarskjöld (Lipsey 2013 Lipsey, Roger. 2013. Hammarskjöld: A Life. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
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      , 153), who himself considered the UN a “secular church” (Foote 1962 Foote, Wilder, ed. 1962. Dag Hammarskjöld: Servant of Peace (A Selection of His Speeches and Statements). New York: Harper & Row.
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      4. For a similar notion of the UN (as the “cathedral of the international community, the organizational repository of the community’s collective beliefs”) see Barnett (1997 Barnett, Michael. 1997. “Bringing in the New World Order: Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United Nations.” World Politics 49: 526–551. doi: 10.1017/S0043887100008042
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      Pope John XXIII (1963 John XXIII. 1963. “Pacem in Terris.” Vatican.
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      ) addressed in his encyclical Pacem in Terris “all men and women of goodwill” and Hammarskjöld argued that “all men and women of good will can influence the course of history in the direction of the ideals expressed in the Charter” (Foote 1962 Foote, Wilder, ed. 1962. Dag Hammarskjöld: Servant of Peace (A Selection of His Speeches and Statements). New York: Harper & Row.
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      , 45). In his most recent encyclical, Pope Francis (2015 Pope Francis. 2015. “Laudato si.”
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      ) even speaks to “every person living on this planet.” Putting forward such broad claims suggests that both individuals perceive themselves as moral authorities, working for the common good.

      Moral authority invoking the common good is not only a publicly called for demand, but a necessity of human conduct in a globalized world. The world is facing a growing “enlargement of human expectations” as UNSG Cuéllar (1995 Cuéllar, Javier P. de. 1995. “Reflecting on the Past and Contemplating the Future.” Global Governance 1: 149–170.
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      , 168) called it. This makes the pope and the UNSG disputed but appealing figures of moral authority. While there is no way to foresee the end of the current papacy, Francis seems to be an indicator that supports the main thesis of this article: it is the combination of institutions and individuals that shapes their positions and establishes the power of moral leadership that eventually transforms institutions (Franco 2013a Franco, Massimo. 2013a. “The First Global Pope.” Survival 55 (3): 71–77. doi:10.1080/00396338.2013.802853.
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      Table

      CSVDisplay Table
      There are extensive studies on the power and the moral authority of the UNSG (Chesterman 2007 Chesterman, Simon, ed. 2007. Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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      ; Kille 2007 Kille, Kent J., ed. 2007. The UN Secretary-General and Moral Authority: Ethics and Religion in International Leadership. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
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      , 2006 Kille, Kent J. 2006. From Manager to Visionary: The Secretary-General of the United Nations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
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      ), less so and mainly historical ones on the pope (Coppa 1998 Coppa, Frank J. 1998. The Modern Papacy, 1798–1995. Longman History of the Papacy. London: Addison Wesley Longman.
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      , 2008 Coppa, Frank J. 2008. Politics and the Papacy in the Modern World. Westport, CT: Praeger.
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      , 2014 Coppa, Frank J. 2014. The Papacy in the Modern World: A Political History. London: Reaktion Books.
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      ; Hall 1997 Hall, Rodney B. 1997. “Moral Authority as a Power Resource.” International Organization 51 (4): 591–622. doi: 10.1162/002081897550465
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      ; Riccards 1998 Riccards, Michael P. 1998. Vicars of Christ: Popes, Power, and Politics in the Modern World. New York: Crossroad.
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      ). This is surprising, as research points out that via their leaders, institutions can have unexpected and unintended effects beyond their formal codified mission statement (Barnett and Finnemore 1999 Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. 1999. “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations.” International Organization 53 (4): 699–732. doi: 10.1162/002081899551048
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      ). This, however, is only possible if institutions are, first, assumed to be moral agents within a social practice and, second, if the leaders’ followers are taken into account of the potential and extent of moral authority (Kellerman 2008 Kellerman, Barbara. 2008. Followership: How Followers are Creating Change and Changing Leaders. (Leadership for the Common Good). Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
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      ): “The very notion of an individual moral agent presupposes the existence of a collective practice with its associated ethic embedded in it” (Frost 2003 Frost, Mervyn. 2003. “Constitutive Theory and Moral Accountability: Individuals, Institutions, and Disperse Practices.” In Can Institutions Have Responsibilities? Collective Moral Agency and International Relations, edited by Toni Erskine, 84–99. Houndmills, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
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      , 98 original in italics; see also Frost 1996 Frost, Mervyn. 1996. Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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      ). Agency, then, takes shape in and due to sociality. Nonetheless, modest emphasis has been placed on leadership and transformative action. Leaders engage in transformative action if they override existing structures and create something unusual based on their agency (Menaldo 2013 Menaldo, Mark. 2013. Leadership and Transformative Ambition in International Relations. (New Horizons in Leadership Studies). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
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      5. Transforming leadership, then, implies a “metamorphosis” whereas “change” in the context of leadership simply means to substitute (Burns 2003 Burns, James M. 2003. Transforming Leadership: A New Pursuit of Happiness. New York: Grove Press.
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      View all notes

      Many definitions of leadership focus on traits-based leadership. They define a leader as “someone who helps a group create and achieve shared goals” (Nye 2008 Nye, Joseph S. 2008. The Powers to Lead: Soft, Hard, and Smart. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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      , 18). Often it is charisma that drives moral authority as charismatic authority is “a rule over men, whether predominantly external or predominantly internal, to which the governed submit because of their belief in the extraordinary quality of the specific person” (Weber, Gerth, and Mills 1946 Weber, Max, Hans H. Gerth, and C. W. Mills. 1946. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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      , 295). Likewise, role theory and micro foundations of behavioural International Relations hold that the positions have changed because key individuals have changed the role of that position in the institution (Harnisch, Frank, and Maull 2011 Harnisch, Sebastian, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns Maull. 2011. Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses. New York: Routledge.
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      Moreover, definitions of leadership distinguish between leadership and executive tasks to “differentiate the responsibilities and authority.” However, executive leadership is about “determining an organization’s goals and mobilizing constituents to achieve those goals” (Schroeder 2014 Schroeder, Michael B. 2014. “Executive Leadership in the Study of International Organization: A Framework for Analysis.” International Studies Review 16 (3): 339–361. doi:10.1111/misr.12147.
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      ) point out particular moments when the impact of individual leaders on the course of events is most likely. This is when political institutions are unstable, young, in crisis, collapse, institutional constraints are limited and the issue or situation is peripheral, unusual, or ambiguous (Mingst and Arreguín-Toft 2013 Mingst, Karen A., and Ivan M. Arreguín-Toft. 2013. Essentials of International Relations. 6th ed. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Incorporated.
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      Institutions, Agency, and the Pope’s and UNSG’s Moral Leadership
      I argue that a combination of individuals in institutions leads to the influence and possession of moral authority beyond constitutional arrangements and external structural constraints and opportunities. A parallel look at the pope and the UNSG facilitates such an understanding of agency and leadership. While stressing a comparative perspective (Helms 2012 Helms, Ludger, ed. 2012. Comparative Political Leadership. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
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      ), this provides additional insights into ontological and epistemological developments and produces more general results on moral leadership.6
      6. Gordenker (1966/1967 Gordenker, Leon. 1966/1967. “U Thant and the Office of U.N. Secretary-General.” International Journal 22 (1): 1–16. doi: 10.2307/40199735
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      , 6) stressed this aspect at the example of Pope Paul VI and UNSG U Thant.
      View all notes

      There are two basic caveats to this argument. First, comparing the pope and the UNSG brings up shortcomings in terms of structural comparability and technicalities. However, apart from choosing them because of their normative attributes, both can be compared because of the nature of the organizations in which they are embedded.7
      7. This is to ignore for now the fact that the pope is also head of a micro state.
      View all notes
      The character of agents, institutional constraints, and external effects influence the two institutions and their individual agency. Whereas in-house constraints (e.g. the Curia, the Security Council) can candidly be located, the impact of external influences is hard to evaluate. Second, despite the similarities between the pope and the UNSG, there are limiting parameters of a comparison in the formulation of their power (i.e. political and religious leader vs. administrative official).8
      8. Lord Gladwyn (1972 Gladwyn, Hubert M. G. J. B. 1972. The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn. New York: Weybright Talley.
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      thought that he almost regarded himself as a Lay Pope. If he did, he should have realized that the Secretariat was not exactly the equivalent of a Papal Chancery. Even less was the General Assembly a College of Cardinals. He could not, in fact, have anything like the apparatus that is at the disposal of the Holy Father. Nor was there any generally acceptable philosophy which could illuminate his path. The Charter does not really indicate the things that states should do in order to achieve grace. It lays down rather what they should not do in order to avert disaster.
      View all notes
      The most important one is that the pope, the “Vicar of Christ” and absolute monarch is, ipso facto, leader of the Catholic Church. The UNSG is chief administrative officer of the UN. Even more so, his potential for moral leadership is constrained by structural forces rooted in a world of states (Thakur 2017 Thakur, Ramesh C. 2017. “Choosing the Ninth United Nations Secretary-General: Looking Back, Looking Ahead.” Global Governance 23: 1–13.
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      One might argue that the UNSG is an administrative officer and mediator, whereas the pope is a religious and political leader. However, popes and UNSGs have been engaged in in-house (i.e. “catholic”) and external (i.e. “political”) mediation. The political engagement of John Paul II during the Cold War comes to mind. But also his successors, Benedict XVI (e.g. on the cultural foundation of Europe) and Francis (e.g. on improving Cuban–US relations) (Álvarez 2014 Álvarez, Andrés B. 2014. “Vatican: The Key Steps that Led to the Thaw in US-Cuba Relations.” Vatican Insider La Stampa. Accessed December 19.
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      ) intermingled in international politics beyond rhetorical appeals. Another example is Pope Francis’ attempt to escape existing political rivalries, avoiding mirroring the formerly East–West tensions. Instead, he is shifting the focus on geopolitics to Latin America like Pope John Paul II did for Eastern Europe (Flamini 2014 Flamini, Roland. 2014, July/August. “Peter and Caesar: Is Pope Francis Shifting the Vaticans’s Worldview?” World Affairs, 25–33.
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      ). A particular case in point is Francis’ allegedly “giving up” on human rights and referring instead more to social justice, structural problems, and collective solutions that individual rights probably are not able to solve (Moyn 2015 Moyn, Samuel. 2015. “Pope Francis has Given Up on Human Rights: That’s a Good Thing.” The Washington Post.
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      ). Another example is the prevailing international trend of enforcing responsibility and accountability (Ainley 2008 Ainley, Kirsten. 2008. “Individual Agency and Responsibility for Atrocity.” In Confronting Evil in International Relations: Ethical Responses to Problems of Moral Agency, edited by Renée Jeffery, 37–60. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
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      ). This trend has been pushed (e.g. by Ghali and Pius XII) and restrained (e.g. by Hammarskjöld and Francis) by popes and UNSGs alike.

      Individuals in Institutions
      The literature on leadership does not address that what and how leaders do something is as important as what they are and what resources they command. Whereas “[p]ower does not equal leadership” (Nabers 2011 Nabers, Dirk. 2011. “Identity and Role Change in International Politics.” In Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns Maull, 74–92. New York: Routledge.
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      , 88), the opposite is also true: leadership does not equal “hard” power. Examples are John Paul II and Dag Hammarskjöld. In both cases, it was also their charisma which led to transformative leadership. Their performance did not only change the institution due to their delegated, expert, and moral authority. Their charisma became the impetus for institutional change and policy outreach and, ultimately, account for transformative leadership. This is the case for Hammarskjöld’s efforts (e.g. the independent international civil service), John XXIII’s initiatives (e.g. the initiation of the second Vatican Council), or John Paul II’s public stance on matters of the Cold War (e.g. the help to initiate protests against communist regimes) (Weigel 1992 Weigel, George. 1992. The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism. New York: Oxford University Press.
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      Popes and UNSGs laid out strategic plans and visions, yet their implementing strategies differed widely. Hammarskjöld had a vision of an independent Secretariat and civil service which he implemented (Childers and Urquhart 1994 Childers, Erskine, and Brian Urquhart. 1994. Renewing the United Nations System: Development Dialogue. Uppsala: Dag Hammarsköld Foundation.
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      ). John XXIII’s vision of peace and engaging in the crises in the nuclear age is another example (Flamini 1980 Flamini, Roland. 1980. Pope, Premier, President: The Cold War Summit That Never was. New York: Macmillan.
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      ). Some chose follower-oriented strategies, while others chose opposition-oriented strategies (i.e. mobilizing those opposed to the vision). Some of them exercised self-restraint while working on their vision (e.g. Hammarskjöld changed the organization of the Secretariat, John XXIII initiated the Second Vatican Council), some did not (e.g. Boutros-Ghali, John Paul II). Some accompanied their implementation strategies with institutional and administrative changes (e.g. Hammarskjöld, John Paul II), some not (e.g. Boutros-Ghali, John XXIII).9
      9. In the case of the pope this can also be located at the installment of like-minded cardinals to increase the chances that they will eventually elect a pope that continues their efforts (e.g. Goodstein, Pearce, and Pecanha 2016 Goodstein, Laurie, Adam Pearce, and Sergio Pecanha. 2016. “Pope Francis’ Race against Time to Reshape the Church.” The New York Times, November 18. Accessed February 14, 2017.
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      ). This is different from the election of the UNSG which is predominantly a matter of the permanent members of the Security Council without any realistic chance of the office holder to influence the choosing of his successor.
      View all notes

      Studies on the impact of individuals reveal limits when it comes to the pope’s and the UNSG’s host institutions. Both institutions, the Holy See and the UN, are not “new.” Consider the cases of Hammarskjöld and John XXIII: the UN Secretariat at that time was young and institutional constraints were limited (e.g. via the Security Council at the beginning of the term). The conditions Hammarskjöld encountered where unusual and ambiguous (e.g. the joint intervention of France and Great Britain over the Suez Canal crisis and the subsequent installation of the first UN peacekeeping mission). The same is true for the tenure of John XXIII. Although the papacy was not young, unstable, or in a state of crisis, the institutional constraints (e.g. via the Curia) were rather limited. What is more, in the Cuban Missile Crisis John XXIII encountered an unusual situation that enabled him to mediate between Khrushchev and Kennedy (Flamini 1980 Flamini, Roland. 1980. Pope, Premier, President: The Cold War Summit That Never was. New York: Macmillan.
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      10. One prominent output of the Pope’s engagement was the encyclical Pacem in Terris (John XXIII 1963 John XXIII. 1963. “Pacem in Terris.” Vatican.
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      The same circumstances enabled U Thant to assist in the Cuban Missile crisis by establishing a communication line between the great powers (Dorn and Pauk 2009 Dorn, A. W., and Robert Pauk. 2009. “Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Diplomatic History 33 (2): 261–292. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.2008.00762.x.
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      ).

      Looking at the pope and the UNSG demonstrates the lacuna in the literature on leadership of individuals in institutional contexts and their social setting (Battilana 2006 Battilana, J. 2006. “Agency and Institutions: The Enabling Role of Individuals’ Social Position.” Organization 13 (5): 653–676. doi:10.1177/1350508406067008.
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      ; Helms 2014 Helms, Ludger, ed. 2014. “Global Political Leadership in the Twenty-First Century: Problems and Prospects.” Contemporary Politics 20 (3): 261–277. doi:10.1080/13569775.2014.911499.
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      ). Although few studies pay attention to the two positions, “[d]ecision making does matter” (Hagan 2001 Hagan, Hoe D. 2001. “Does Decision Making Matter? Systemic Assumptions vs. Historical Reality in International Relations Theory.” International Studies Review 3 (2): 5–46. doi: 10.1111/1521-9488.00233
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      ) and “who leads matters” (Hermann et al. 2001 Hermann, Margaret G., Thomas Preston, Baghat Korany, and Timothy M. Shaw. 2001. “Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals.” International Studies Review 3 (2): 83–131. doi:10.1111/1521-9488.00235.
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      ). This is even more the case regarding the pope and the UNSG (Cox 1969 Cox, Robert W. 1969. “The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization.” International Organization 23 (2): 205–230. doi:10.1017/S002081830003157X.
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      ). Popes and UNSGs, however, might be good “statesmen” and leaders only in the capacity of their offices in the Holy See and in the UNSG Secretariat (Claude 1971 Claude, Inis L. 1971. Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization. 4th ed. New York: Random House.
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      , 210). Studies on the UNSGs point out that personal leadership style is paramount (Kille 2006 Kille, Kent J. 2006. From Manager to Visionary: The Secretary-General of the United Nations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
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      ) but principal-agent theories are offering too less of an explanation of the autonomy of UNSGs (Karns 2012 Karns, Margaret P. 2012. “The Roots of UN Post-conflict Peacebuilding: A Case Study of Autonomous Agency.” In International Organizations as Self-directed Actors, edited by J. E. Oestreich, 60–88. Abington: Routledge.
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      The papacy and the UNSG Secretariat are potentially shaped by their office holders, internal factors of the institutions, and by variables outside the immediate scope and influence of the institutions and their representatives. Popes often have little international experience and tend to depend on their secretaries of state. The UNSG, on the other hand, is a professional diplomat and servant of many masters. In both cases it is also the “rational-legal authority that [International Organizations] embody also gives them power independent of the states that created them and channels that power in particular directions” (Barnett and Finnemore 1999 Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. 1999. “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations.” International Organization 53 (4): 699–732. doi: 10.1162/002081899551048
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      , 699).

      Possessing agency, that is possessing internal powers and capacities (Barnes 2000 Barnes, Barry. 2000. Understanding Agency: Social Theory and Responsible Action. London: Sage.
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      , 5), is not only based on the pope’s and the UNSG’s weak material and institutional power (i.e. head of state, administrational officer, agenda setter, etc.). It is also based on their normative power provided by their institutions. Claude (1971 Claude, Inis L. 1971. Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization. 4th ed. New York: Random House.
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      ). As such, both positions and the “normative power” they entail matter in world politics as they are prone for moral leadership.

      Moral Leadership
      The similarity between the pope and the Secretary-General illustrates, first, how both exercise their posts out of a combination of weak material capability and normative power. Focusing on the normative role of power adds another facet to the discussion on power beyond military capabilities. Evaluating the moral power of the pope and the UNSG takes into account “the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification” (Barnett and Duvall 2005 Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall. 2005. “Power in International Politics.” International Organization 59: 39–75. doi: 10.1017/S0020818305050010
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      , 43). Second, in recognizing the similarity between the two, the nature of institutions and their office holders are evidence of a mutual relationship of secular and religious world political representation and normative claims therein (Agensky 2017 Agensky, Jonathan C. 2017, January 12. “Recognizing Religion: Politics, History, and the ‘Long 19th Century’.” European Journal of International Relations, 1–27.
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      ). Third, looking at them illustrates that both struggle between policy positions of interventionism and restraint.

      In representing transnational institutions,11
      11. Here I refer to “institutions” as formal organizations with “prescribed hierarchies and the capacity for purposive action” (Keohane 1988 Keohane, Robert O. 1988. “International Institutions: Two Approaches.” International Studies Quarterly 32 (4): 379–396. doi: 10.2307/2600589
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      the pope and the UNSG claim to speak for the world’s population. The UNSG speaks in his legal right as chief administrative officer as set up in the Charter (United Nations, art. 1,4), to “be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations”. In the words of the first UNSG Lie (1954 Lie, Trygve. 1954. In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations. New York: The Macmillan Company.
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      , 506). As such, he has the responsibility to heighten international awareness as UNSG Boutros-Ghali (1996 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. 1996. “Global Leadership After the Cold War.” Foreign Affairs 75 (2): 86–98. doi: 10.2307/20047490
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      , 88) termed it. The pope, on the other hand, is “the Vicar of Christ, and the pastor of the universal Church on earth” (Code of Canon Law, Can. 331) and “obtains full and supreme power in the Church” (Code of Canon Law, Can. 332 §1). He acts on the grounds that “the Church believes she can contribute greatly toward making the family of man and its history more human” (Second Vatican Council 1965 Second Vatican Council. 1965. “Pastoral Constitution Gadium et Spes.”
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      In a globalized world political leadership requires a “bold and noble vision for the community” where the UNSG must have the “elusive ability to make others connect emotionally and intellectually to a larger cause that transcends their immediate self-interest” (Thakur 2006 Thakur, Ramesh C. 2006. The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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      ). Moreover, neither of the two commands any traditional hard material power. However, it is not the “lack of an army to command, but [the] lack of a party to lead and a body politic to rally behind” (Claude 1971 Claude, Inis L. 1971. Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization. 4th ed. New York: Random House.
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      What is presented as crucial in world politics by the pope and the UNSG as moral leaders is the paramount value both attribute to peace and human rights (e.g. Claude 1996 Claude, Inis L. 1996. “Peace and Security: Prospective Roles for the Two United Nations.” Global Governance 2: 289–298.
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      The Pope and the UNSG in World Politics
      The pope and the UNSG demonstrate executive leadership and entrepreneurial power (Haack and Kille 2012 Haack, Kirsten, and Kent J. Kille. 2012. “The UN Secretary-General and Self-directed Leadership: Development of the Democracy Agenda.” In International Organizations as Self-directed Actors: A Framework for Analysis, edited by Joel E. Oestreich, 29–59, 64. Abingdon: Routledge.
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      ) by deploying “ideas and information to produce significant structural change” (Goddard 2009 Goddard, Stacie E. 2009. “Brokering Change: Networks and Entrepreneurs in International Politics.” International Theory 1 (2): 249–281. doi:10.1017/S1752971909000128.
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      , 251). The two institutions and their leaders are “self-directed actors” (Oestreich 2012 Oestreich, Joel E., ed. 2012. International Organizations as Self-directed Actors: A Framework for Analysis 64. New York: Routledge.
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      ) in possession of autonomous agency. This aspect also offers insights to international political conduct in focusing on moral stewardship under structural constraints. To give one example: Why is it that the “silent diplomacy” of Hammarskjöld was not carried on to this extent by his successors (Ask and Mark-Jungkoist 2005 Ask, Sten, and Anna Mark-Jungkoist. 2005. The Adventure of Peace: Dag Hammarskjöld and the Future of the UN. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
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      ), let alone that it became a part of the institutional structure? In a similar way, the shuttle diplomacy of Pope John Paul II, lobbying for political transformation via a conception of anti-politics,12
      12. Griffith (2001 Griffith, Paul. 2001. “The Future of the Papacy: A Symposium.” First Things (New York, N Y ) (111): 35–36.
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      was not carried on by his successor (see also Christiansen 2006 Christiansen, Drew. 2006. “Catholic Peacemaking, 1991–2005: The Legacy of Pope John Paul II.” The Review of Faith & International Affairs 4 (2): 21–28. doi:10.1080/15570274.2006.9523246.
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      International leadership, as pointed out above, is about particular individuals in particular institutions (Frost 2003 Frost, Mervyn. 2003. “Constitutive Theory and Moral Accountability: Individuals, Institutions, and Disperse Practices.” In Can Institutions Have Responsibilities? Collective Moral Agency and International Relations, edited by Toni Erskine, 84–99. Houndmills, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
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      , 84), the ideas they promote, and how they attribute and give the office meaning by those ideas. The rhetorical emphasis of international law as a guarantor for international order is something both leaders emphasize (Johnston 2003 Johnston, Ian. 2003. “The Role of the UN Secretary-General: The Power of Persuasion Based on Law.” Global Governance 9 (4): 441–458.
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      , para. 434). The two individuals act in world politics not on behalf of a particular nation but for collectives and thus transcend inter-national and intra-national boundaries.13
      13. Again, the Pope does so, but insignificantly (i.e. for the State of the Vatican City).
      View all notes

      Collective practices are an overlooked element that ground themselves not only on the formal, constitutional practice, but on elements that go beyond such a practice.14
      14. Hammarskjöld captured this aspect in the following remarks: “The principles of the Charter are, by far, greater than the Organization in which they are embodied, and the aims which they are to safeguard are holier than the policies of any single nation or people” (Security Council Official Records 1956 Security Council Official Records. 1956. “Eleventh Year, 751st Meeting.”
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      The question, for example, is not only why John Paul II contributed to the downfall of Communism, but rather how he managed to do so at all and how his actions influenced the conceptualization of the papacy. Inquiring such questions not only provides insights to the papacy and the UNSG but likely also produce general outputs as they are entrepreneurs and followers of normative trends. The pope and the UNSG are nuances in the split between conservative and liberal ideals in world politics. The persistence of nationalism, the “rise of the rest,” and great power aspirations are evidence for prevailing conservative paradigms. Aspirations for global governance, development of principles in favour of human rights such as the Responsibility to Protect, cosmopolitanism and the focus on world society are evidence for the latter (Bernstein and Pauly 2007 Bernstein, Steven F., and Louis W. Pauly. 2007. Global Liberalism and Political Order: Toward a New Grand Compromise? Albany: State University of New York Press.
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      ). The UN Charter always struggled between conservative and liberal poles and so does the papacy, particularly since the end of the Second World War.

      “Papal Interventionism” (Walsh 2000 Walsh, Michael. 2000. “Catholicism and International Relations: Papal Interventionism.” In Religion and Global Order, edited by John L. a. M. W. Esposito, 100–118. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
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      ) is nothing new. Protecting “fundamental rights of individuals and the rights of people in their quest for authentic self-determination” (Araujo 2007 Araujo, Robert J. 2007. “John Paul II – A Man of God and a Servant of Man: The Pope at the United Nations.” Ave Maria Law Review 2: 367–398.
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      ) and increased the approval rate of humanitarian interventions. This is evident in the speeches of the UNSGs and popes since the end of the Second World War. Pope Pius XII, for example, could not remain neutral any longer during the Cold War (Kent 2002 Kent, Peter C. 2002. The Lonely Cold War of Pope Pius XII: The Roman Catholic Church and the Division of Europe, 1943–1950. Montréal, QC: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
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      ) and neither could the UNSGs. Eventually, both individuals have been entrepreneurs and followers of international norms, engaging in their life cycles (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. “International Norms Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization 52 (4): 887–917. doi: 10.1162/002081898550789
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      ), either pushing or hindering them.

      This conceptual framework illustrates that the nature of institutions and their office holders are evidence for a mutual relationship between secular and religious world political representation and normative claims therein. The values and ideas that secularism wanted to ban influence how we live in this global age (Thomas 2010 Thomas, Scott M. 2010. “A Globalized God: Religion’s Growing Influence in International Politics.” Foreign Affairs 89 (6): 93–101.
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      15. This is also the case regarding religion within the UNO’s vast bureaucratic framework (e.g. Haynes 2014 Haynes, Jeffrey. 2014. Faith-based Organizations at the United Nations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
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      The UN stands, as Hammarskjöld once remarked, “outside—necessary outside—all confessions but it is, nevertheless, an instrument of faith. As such, it is inspired by what unites and not by what divides the great religions of the world” (Foote 1962 Foote, Wilder, ed. 1962. Dag Hammarskjöld: Servant of Peace (A Selection of His Speeches and Statements). New York: Harper & Row.
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      16. The Charter does not encompass a reference to God or religious values yet its Preamble makes it clear that “nations express their faith in the dignity and worth of the human person.”
      View all notes

      Conclusion
      This article argued, using the example of the pope and the UNSG, that institutions can have effects via their leaders beyond their formal mission statement, often translated as moral leadership. If those individuals link agency and responsibility, they can outgrow constitutional arrangements and external constraints. It is a combination of individuals in institutions that leads to unexpected and unintended effects such as the evolution of the papacy and the UNSG as instances of moral authorities and sometimes even transformative leadership. This requires future empirical research to bolster those preliminary and explanatory propositions presented in this conceptual framework.

      Acknowledgements
      I would like to thank the journal’s editors and reviewers as well as the reviewers of the project for their comments, suggestions, and interest. I also would like to thank The Europe Center at Stanford University for hosting me as a visiting scholar (2016–2018).

      Notes
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      2. I am aware that, in a formal sense, neither the UNSG nor the pope is an “executive officer.”

      3. Regardless the demand for a global leader, in case of the UNSG, this demand “has not generally been matched by a supply of high-quality candidates” (Chesterman 2015 Chesterman, Simon, ed. 2015. “The Secretary-General We Deserve?” Global Governance 21: 13–505.
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      4. For a similar notion of the UN (as the “cathedral of the international community, the organizational repository of the community’s collective beliefs”) see Barnett (1997 Barnett, Michael. 1997. “Bringing in the New World Order: Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United Nations.” World Politics 49: 526–551. doi: 10.1017/S0043887100008042
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      5. Transforming leadership, then, implies a “metamorphosis” whereas “change” in the context of leadership simply means to substitute (Burns 2003 Burns, James M. 2003. Transforming Leadership: A New Pursuit of Happiness. New York: Grove Press.
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      6. Gordenker (1966/1967 Gordenker, Leon. 1966/1967. “U Thant and the Office of U.N. Secretary-General.” International Journal 22 (1): 1–16. doi: 10.2307/40199735
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      7. This is to ignore for now the fact that the pope is also head of a micro state.

      8. Lord Gladwyn (1972 Gladwyn, Hubert M. G. J. B. 1972. The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn. New York: Weybright Talley.
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      thought that he almost regarded himself as a Lay Pope. If he did, he should have realized that the Secretariat was not exactly the equivalent of a Papal Chancery. Even less was the General Assembly a College of Cardinals. He could not, in fact, have anything like the apparatus that is at the disposal of the Holy Father. Nor was there any generally acceptable philosophy which could illuminate his path. The Charter does not really indicate the things that states should do in order to achieve grace. It lays down rather what they should not do in order to avert disaster.

      9. In the case of the pope this can also be located at the installment of like-minded cardinals to increase the chances that they will eventually elect a pope that continues their efforts (e.g. Goodstein, Pearce, and Pecanha 2016 Goodstein, Laurie, Adam Pearce, and Sergio Pecanha. 2016. “Pope Francis’ Race against Time to Reshape the Church.” The New York Times, November 18. Accessed February 14, 2017.
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      10. One prominent output of the Pope’s engagement was the encyclical Pacem in Terris (John XXIII 1963 John XXIII. 1963. “Pacem in Terris.” Vatican.
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      11. Here I refer to “institutions” as formal organizations with “prescribed hierarchies and the capacity for purposive action” (Keohane 1988 Keohane, Robert O. 1988. “International Institutions: Two Approaches.” International Studies Quarterly 32 (4): 379–396. doi: 10.2307/2600589
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      12. Griffith (2001 Griffith, Paul. 2001. “The Future of the Papacy: A Symposium.” First Things (New York, N Y ) (111): 35–36.
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      13. Again, the Pope does so, but insignificantly (i.e. for the State of the Vatican City).

      14. Hammarskjöld captured this aspect in the following remarks: “The principles of the Charter are, by far, greater than the Organization in which they are embodied, and the aims which they are to safeguard are holier than the policies of any single nation or people” (Security Council Official Records 1956 Security Council Official Records. 1956. “Eleventh Year, 751st Meeting.”
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      15. This is also the case regarding religion within the UNO’s vast bureaucratic framework (e.g. Haynes 2014 Haynes, Jeffrey. 2014. Faith-based Organizations at the United Nations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
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      16. The Charter does not encompass a reference to God or religious values yet its Preamble makes it clear that “nations express their faith in the dignity and worth of the human person.”

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